Power and Inefficient Institutions by Busch, Lutz Alexander & Muthoo, Abhinay
POWER AND INEFFICIENT INSTITUTIONS
LUTZ-ALEXANDER BUSCH AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
Abstract. This paper is concerned with the persistence of inef-
ficient institutions. Why are they not replaced by more efficient
ones? What and/or who prevents such change? We provide an an-
swer to these questions based on two key ideas. The principal idea
is that institutional change on an issue may adversely affect the
bargaining power of some agents on different issues. The second
is that certain kinds of frictions (or transaction costs) are present,
which do not allow for this deteriorating bargaining power to be
compensated for. A key insight obtained from our analysis is that,
the greater is the degree of inequality in the players’ bargaining
powers the more likely it is that inefficient institutions will persist.
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“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” Douglass
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990.
“The . . . stumbling blocks to beneficial institutional change in many poor
countries may have more to do with distributive conflicts and asymmetries
in bargaining power.” Pranab Bardhan, Distributive Conflicts, Collective
Action, and Institutional Economics, 2001.
1. Introduction
Institutions matter. Today this insight lies (again) at the heart of
mainstream economic thinking and research. That wasn’t the case
about two to three decades ago when competitive equilibrium theory
dominated the profession, before the developments in, and applications
of, subjects such as game theory, information economics and contract
theory. Furthermore, it is an insight that today informs the policies and
programmes of international organizations (such as the World Bank)
who are promoting economic development in the poorer parts of the
world. For a discussion and analysis of the importance of institutions
for economic, political and social development, see the World Bank’s
World Development Reports The State in a Changing World (1997)
and Building Institutions for Markets (2002). For a more formal and
academic discussion see Bardhan (2001) and Hoff and Stiglitz (2001).1
One key issue concerns the persistence of inefficient institutions.
Why are inefficient institutions not replaced by more efficient ones?
What and/or who prevents such change? In this paper we provide one
answer to these questions, an answer which uncovers a close and deep
connection between inequality in bargaining power and the persistence
of inefficient institutions.
According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992), there are four basic ap-
proaches to explaining institutional organization: Marx explains or-
ganization as a reflection of underlying power relationships and class
interest; the Harvard Industrial Organization approach can be summa-
rized as explaining organization as an attempt to manipulate prices;
the transactions cost approach associated with the work of Coase and
Williamson sees organization as minimizing transactions costs; finally,
the modern efficiency approach sees organization as the efficient choice
1Both articles are in a volume entitled Frontiers of Development Economics,
edited by Gerald Meier and Joseph Stiglitz. It contains articles by some of the
pioneers and current leading scholars in development economics. They take stock
of the current state of development economics, and discuss the main issues and
problems of development. A central theme is the importance of institutions and
institutional change.
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for parties that can bargain effectively. The latter is based on an appli-
cation of the Coase Theorem, which — for appropriate environments
— applies value maximization. Milgrom and Roberts point out explic-
itly that it would be wrong to apply the Coase Theorem to issues such
as land tenure or slavery, since too many (all?) of its assumptions are
violated in these cases.
The Coase Theorem, the reader may recall, states that if parties
bargain to an efficient agreement (which requires effective bargaining,
implementation, and enforcement) and if their preferences display no
wealth effects (that is, are quasi-linear in money) then the value cre-
ating activities are allocated according to efficiency criteria only, and
other factors such as bargaining power or asset ownership affect only
how benefits and costs are shared. In other words, under frictionless
conditions the parties choose efficient institutions. Why then do ineffi-
cient institutions persist? One of the many restrictive conditions of the
Coase theorem must be violated. Most often the culprit is identified in
some form of transactions cost, chiefly asymmetric information.
This point has been noted by several authors — see, for example,
the classic treatise by Douglas North, North (1990), where he develops
the thesis that inefficient institutions persist due to the presence of
various kinds of frictions (or transactions costs) such as those created
by informational asymmetries. Not surprisingly, the explanation that
we develop in this paper is also based upon the presence of certain
kinds of frictions. Specifically, we consider situations in which parties
are unable to make binding commitments, or, to put it differently, are
unable to write enforceable (long-term) contracts. In addition, winners
of an efficiency-enhancing institutional change are wealth-constrained
and unable to borrow the potentially large amounts of money required
to compensate the losers of such a change upfront.
Our explanation builds on two key ideas. The principal idea is that
institutional change on one issue may adversely affect the bargaining
power of some agents on a different issue. The second is the one just
described, namely the presence of the frictions stated above, which do
not allow for this deteriorating bargaining power to be compensated for.
We study these issues in the simple but abstract setting of a two-stage
game of perfect and complete information. The model has two players
(individuals or organizations) who have the option to negotiate over an
efficiency-enhancing institutional change. However, they know that if
such a change is implemented then the players’ respective bargaining
powers over a different (second) issue will be altered; which, in turn,
will affect their ex-ante incentives to conduct the institutional change in
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the first place.2 Our analysis begins by characterizing conditions such
that the efficiency-enhancing institutional change does not take place
if and only if these conditions hold. We then analyze these conditions
to tease out some specific results and insights about the persistence (or
otherwise) of inefficient institutions. A key insight that we obtain is
that, a small degree of inequality in the players’ bargaining powers is
conducive for efficient institutional change, but not a large degree of
such inequality; in that latter case, inefficient institutions are likely to
persist. Several other results and insights are derived such as the insight
that, the larger are the efficiency gains associated with the institutional
change the more likely it is that such change takes place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two
subsections, we present two real-life examples in order to illustrate our
main ideas, their consequences, and their applicability; and then in the
third subsection we discuss the related literature. Section 2 presents
our model and section 3 our results. Concluding remarks are offered in
section 4.
1.1. An Example in Development. In the villages of several poor
countries (such as India) there is a great inequality in land ownership
with land concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of
landlords. The landlords in such villages not only provide employment
to the villagers but are also their main source of credit.3 An important
consequence of this arrangement is that the few landlords are signifi-
cantly richer than the landless villagers. Together with the fact that
there are only a few landlords but many landless villagers, this bestows
great bargaining power to the landlords in not only the labour but also
the credit markets.
An important empirical observation is that, for a variety of reasons
(including agency arguments) large farms tend to be less productive
than small farms. As such, it is argued that land redistribution, lead-
ing to greater equality of land ownership, would enhance productivity
and hence the aggregate surplus that is generated. And yet such land
redistribution has not taken place. There are several reasons for that
2The players are wealth constrained so that only the payoffs from a given issue
may be allocated, and they are unable to commit to a sharing rule for the second
issue. In the language of the agenda bargaining literature (see, for example, Busch,
2002), the negotiations are independent (or sequential) and implementation of any
agreements is also sequential (i.e., an agreement on the first issue is implemented
when reached, after which negotiations on the second issue commence.)
3See, for example, Bardhan (1980), Braverman and Stiglitz (1982), or Basu
(1998).
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which have been put forward in the literature; see, for example, Baner-
jee (1999).
The theory developed in this paper provides an alternative explana-
tion. To put it succinctly, land redistribution would significantly and
adversely affect a landlord’s bargaining power in the labour and credit
markets; which, in turn, would adversely affect his overall welfare; and
that is why landlords refuse to give up their large landholdings. The
inability to make binding commitments (i.e., to write enforceable, long-
term contracts) prevents the poor villagers from committing not to
exploit their increased bargaining power following land redistribution.
Furthermore, being wealth-constrained and unable to borrow to the
extent required, they cannot compensate the landlords upfront either.
Hence the persistence of this (inefficient) institution, where ownership
of land is concentrated in the hands of a small number of people.
It should be noted that our explanation, which is illustrated in the
above example in an intuitive and informal manner, is not based on any
informational asymmetry. We note this point in particular, since it is
commonplace in the economics literature to explain inefficient outcomes
by appealing to some form of asymmetric information.
1.2. An Example in Industrial Organization. The mechanism
outlined above also applies to more mundane issues, such as the appar-
ent lack of R&D joint ventures and the resultant duplication of R&D
effort, observed in the industrial organization literature. The situation
here is that of two firms who compete in a product market. The firms
may engage in R&D in order to improve their production technology
(lower their unit costs.) R&D is lumpy (i.e., comes in discrete units)
and there are dis-economies of R&D in the industry. Hence it would
be efficient if there were joint R&D; yet under standard assumptions
the market leader may not wish to engage in a joint R&D venture.
As in the previous example, the two parties face two separate issues
— here it is the R&D stage followed by the product market stage —
and for legal reasons it may not be possible for them to agree on a
product market sharing rule when they agree on the terms of the R&D
joint venture. Also, the agreement on the R&D stage (in particular, if
there is any agreement at all) will influence the situation in the sub-
sequent product market, since joint R&D may imply that any initial
technological advantages of one firm must be shared between the joint
venture partners. Hence the initial leader may suffer a potential loss
which cannot be compensated for, given the limitations on contracting
(in particular, that no explicit market sharing rules may be contracted
on, or, equivalently, no profit sharing agreements may be engaged in.)
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In the Appendix we present a numerical example in which the initial
low cost firm refuses to establish an efficiency-enhancing “research joint
venture” in equilibrium. Again, the persistence of the inefficiency is not
due to asymmetric information but to asymmetric bargaining power.
1.3. Related Literature. A key motivation of this paper is that in-
stitutions matter for economic, political and social development and
performance. Hence a raison d’etre for studying institutional change
in general, and the theme of the persistence of inefficient institutions
in particular. As such the analysis and results in this paper, while
specifically concerned with the latter theme, may also have some wider
interest and import. Scholars, for example, in the growing field of
Political Economics, who explore the impact of specific political insti-
tutions on economic policy and performance, may find the contribution
here of some interest; for a recent survey of that field, see Persson and
Tabellini (2000).
Similarly, in industrial organization, specifically the theory of the
firm, the issues raised here may be able to explain various phenomena
in a new light. In the spirit of the efficiency framework, organizational
form is explained as efficient given the transactions cost and contract-
ing constraints placed on the parties. Our work thus relates to issues
raised in Tirole (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and the large
literature on asset ownership and the firm (see, for example, Hart,
1995). The novel aspect is the explicit consideration of the bargaining
environment and the careful analysis of bargaining power. Doing so we
demonstrate that an apparently suboptimal organizational form may
persist because the Pareto dominating allocations cannot be achieved
in equilibrium since the more efficient form would be disadvantageous
to one of the parties.
We are, however, concerned specifically with the issue of the persis-
tence (or otherwise) of inefficient institutions. While several authors
have written on this theme, it is arguably Douglass North who has
been a pioneer in the study of institutions and institutional change;
see, especially, North (1990). His work, while informal, addresses a
whole host of issues related to this topic. The importance of the pres-
ence of various kinds of transaction costs for explaining the persistence
of inefficient institutions is a main focus of his work. Our analysis also
requires the presence of certain kinds of transaction costs such as the
inability to make binding commitments. However, we focus attention
upon the role and impact that distributive conflicts may have on in-
stitutional change. In particular, our main insight that there is a close
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relationship between inequality in bargaining power and the persistence
of inefficient institutions is novel.
There are two recent papers which have also pointedly emphasized
and discussed the importance of such distributive conflicts for the per-
sistence of inefficient institutions.4
First is the paper by Bardhan (2001). In it he provides a discussion
of various issues concerned with the persistence of inefficient institu-
tions. In particular, Bardhan makes several points which, in effect, lay
the ground for the model and analysis in this paper. Indeed, for further
motivation of our model and analysis, we refer the reader to his article.
He discusses and emphasizes the notion that a productivity-enhancing
institutional change may create winners and losers, and that the former
may be unable to compensate the latter; and thus the losers would re-
sist the change that is potentially Pareto improving. This notion lies at
the heart of our analysis; we formally develop it, and explore its range
of validity and implications. Bardhan suggests that, “. . . the obstruc-
tion by vested interests can be formalized as a simple Nash bargaining
model.” This is, of course, exactly the approach that underlies our
model.5
Second, there is the paper by Acemoglu (2002). In this article he
argues that distributive and social conflicts are key factors determining
the persistence (or otherwise) of inefficient institutions. In particular,
he studies a model to explore the fundamental point that the inabil-
ity to make binding commitments can be a decisive factor inhibiting
efficiency-enhancing institutional change from taking place. He also
provides an interesting discussion of several real-world examples to il-
lustrate this point. Rather than describe those here, we refer the reader
to his paper for that, and also for references to some other studies that
make a similar point, albeit only implicitly and in various specific con-
texts. While the formal model studied in Acemoglu (2002) and the
model studied in this paper are quite different, the underlying motiva-
tion is similar, as are some of the key ideas.
2. The Model
2.1. An Overview. We consider a situation with two “players” and
two “issues”. A player can be either a single individual or a coalition (or
4Both were brought to our attention after the first draft of this paper was
completed.
5We should also like to mention that he (also) uses land redistribution as an
illustrative example; his discussion is more detailed than our short summary, and
provides additional motivation for our model and analysis.
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group) of individuals. For example, in the context of a rural village in
India, one player could be the single, wealthy landlord, while the other
player comprises of the large number of poor and landless villagers. In
this context, one issue could be land redistribution, while the second
could be an issue concerning the conditions on which the poor are
employed by the landlord or the conditions on which they are offered
credit by him.
There is a status quo in place over both issues. This current state-
of-affairs generates a per-period payoff to each player from each issue.
In the language of bargaining theory, this payoff is a player’s inside
option.6 A basic assumption is that this status quo is inefficient.
The two players first decide whether or not to commence negotia-
tions over the first issue. If they choose not to do so, then the inefficient
status quo remains in place; otherwise negotiations proceed. The deci-
sion (on whether or not to begin negotiations) is made independently
and non-cooperatively. In particular, we assume that both players are
sufficiently wealth-constrained such that no player has enough funds
to be able to make an upfront payment to the other player in order
to get the negotiations going. Furthermore, the players are unable to
make binding commitments (via, for example, enforceable, long-term
contracts) about their respective future actions that would induce them
to come to the negotiating table.
If however the players do proceed to negotiate, then bargaining over
the first issue begins. When and if agreement is reached and imple-
mented over the first issue, the parties then commence bargaining over
the second issue. That second set of negotiations takes place under a
newly established status quo. Each player’s inside option from the first
issue is now determined by the (presumably efficient) agreement just
struck over it. A fundamental assumption that underlies our model is
that the inside option that each player obtains from the second issue is
potentially influenced (altered) by the agreement struck over the first
issue.
The motivation behind the above bargaining agenda with sequen-
tial negotiations and implementation is as follows. We have in mind
situations in which an agreement over one issue (the second one) is
relatively easy to renegotiate, while that is not the case with first is-
sue. Once agreement over the first issue is reached and implemented, it
is too costly to renegotiate that agreement; its implementation implies
changes in the status quo that are difficult to alter. After an agreement
6For a general discussion and analysis of “inside options” — and how they differ,
for example, from “outside options” — see Muthoo (1999).
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over this first issue, the players may have an incentive to renegotiate
any prior agreement over the second issue. Since parties are unable
to write enforceable (long-term) contracts, such renegotiation would
take place. This agenda makes sense for example in those situations in
which the second issue concerns the terms of trade (prices and quanti-
ties) while the first issue concerns the ownership of, or property rights
over, some assets (such as land and capital).
In this model there are two sources (or factors) from which a player
derives “bargaining power”; these are his inside options over the two
issues. It should be noted that a player’s bargaining power in the status
quo (which is his bargaining power before agreement over the first issue
is reached) can differ from his bargaining power after agreement over
the first issue is reached but before agreement over the second issue is
reached. We denote the former a player’s ex ante bargaining power,
and the latter a player’s ex post bargaining power.
2.2. The Formal Set-Up. There are two players, 1 and 2, and two
issues, X and Y . The size of the per-period “cake” (or joint payoff)
created as a result of an agreement over issue k (k = X, Y ) is mk > 0.
Bargaining over issue k is thus equivalent (in utility terms) to bargain-
ing over the partition of this per-period cake. The agenda is fixed and
given: negotiations (if they occur) over the two issues are to be con-
ducted separately and sequentially. Without loss of generality, assume
that the first set of negotiations is over issueX. When and if agreement
is reached over issue X (which is immediately implemented) the sec-
ond set of negotiations over issue Y begins. Failure to reach agreement
over issue X means that the players cannot and/or will not proceed to
negotiate over issue Y . Each player has the option to refuse to bargain
(i.e., each player can choose not to start the negotiations over issue X).
During the first set of negotiations, until agreement is reached over
issue X, the players obtain their inside options. The per-period inside
options from issue k (k = X,Y ) obtained by players 1 and 2 respec-
tively are zk1 and z
k
2 , where z
k
1 + z
k
2 < m
k. This implies that if the
players fail to reach agreement over issue X, then player i’s average (or
per-period) payoff from this impasse is di = z
X
i + z
Y
i . The latter is also
player i’s average payoff from the status-quo.
If the players reach agreement over issue X giving players 1 and 2
respectively shares x and mX − x of the cake (where x ∈ [0,mX ]),
then the agreement is immediately implemented. This means that
from then onward the per-period payoffs to players 1 and 2 from issue
X are x and mX − x respectively. Furthermore, and this is a key
feature of our model, each player’s inside option from issue Y may
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change. It is no longer necessary that player i continues to obtain the
per-period payoff of zYi from issue Y . This is because the particular
agreement over issue X, as captured by x, may strategically affect
the players’ inside options over issue Y . We capture this potential
change as follows: player i’s per-period inside option from issue Y
immediately after agreement x over issue X is struck is fi(x), where
for any x ∈ [0,mX ], f1(x) + f2(x) < mY . For the time being we make
no (additional) assumptions about the nature of the functions f1 and
f2.
We adopt the Nash bargaining solution to describe the outcome of
each set of negotiations, where the manner in which we apply this bar-
gaining solution is informed by non-cooperative bargaining theory (as
discussed, for example, in Muthoo, 1999). This completes the descrip-
tion of our model with two “players” and two “issues”. The model is
a (two-stage) game with perfect information. It will be assumed that
the game is one with complete information. The latter means, in par-
ticular, that all the parameters of the model are common knowledge
between the players.
The core parameters of our model — which play an important role
in our analysis on whether or not, in equilibrium, the inefficient institu-
tions that underlie the status quo are replaced by efficient institutions
— are as follows. First, there are the players’ inside options associated
with the inefficient status quo, namely, zX1 , z
Y
1 , z
X
2 and z
Y
2 . These deter-
mine the players’ absolute and relative bargaining powers in the status
quo. Second, there are the players’ (endogenously determined) new
inside options over issue Y following an agreement over issue X, the
functions f1 and f2. These determine the players’ absolute and relative
bargaining powers after an agreement over issue X is reached. Third,
there are the parameters that capture the magnitudes of the efficiency
gains associated with the beneficial institutional changes, namely, mX
and mY .
By entertaining heterogeneity in the players’ inside options, we are
able to explore the impact that inequality in bargaining power has on
the persistence (or otherwise) of inefficient institutions. It should be
emphasized that this inequality in bargaining power can be ex ante (i.e.,
in the inefficient status quo) and/or ex post (i.e., after an agreement on
issue X but before an agreement on issue Y ). Perhaps not surprisingly,
these two different kinds of inequality can have potentially differing
impacts.
2.3. A Preliminary Result. Using “backward induction” in order
to characterize subgame perfect equilibria, we begin by characterizing
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the outcome of the second set of negotiations conditional on an arbi-
trary outcome in the first. Thus, suppose that the players commence
negotiations and an agreement is struck over issue X on an arbitrary
partition (x,mX − x) of the cake. Now consider the second set of ne-
gotiations, over issue Y . If the players reach an agreement on some
arbitrary partition (y,mY − y), then the per-period payoffs thereafter
to players 1 and 2 are x+ y and mX +mY − x− y. But if the players
fail to strike an agreement over issue Y , then the per-period payoffs to
players 1 and 2 are x+ f1(x) and m
X − x+ f2(x). Applying the Nash
bargaining solution, it follows that the players will reach agreement
over issue Y , and the utility payoffs to players 1 and 2 can be written
as follows:7
P1(x) = x+
[
f1(x) +
1
2
[
mY − f1(x)− f2(x)
]]
,(1)
P2(x) = [m
X − x] +
[
f2(x) +
1
2
[
mY − f1(x)− f2(x)
]]
.(2)
While the first term in each of these expressions is a player’s (cur-
rently arbitrary) per-period payoff from issue X, the term inside the
big bracket is his per-period (Nash bargained) payoff from issue Y .
The latter is the sum of the player’s new inside option payoff from is-
sue Y (following the implementation of the agreement on issue X) and
one-half of the net surplus from issue Y (the amount of cake available
above and beyond the sum of the new inside option payoffs).
It follows that during the negotiations conducted over issue X the
per-period equilibrium payoffs to players 1 and 2 from reaching agree-
ment on an arbitrary partition (x,mX−x) are P1(x) and P2(x). Clearly,
an agreement x on issue X not only determines a player’s payoff from
issue X, but also has a strategic effect on the player’s Nash bargained
payoff from issue Y , by affecting the players’ inside options on issue
Y . It should be noted that if the players fail to reach an agreement on
issue X, then the per-period payoffs to players 1 and 2 are zX1 +z
Y
1 and
zX2 + z
Y
2 respectively. Notice that the sum P1(x) + P2(x) = m
X +mY ,
which, by assumption, strictly exceeds the sum of the per-period inside
option payoffs from disagreement over issue X.
7The manner in which the Nash bargaining solution should be applied in a
bargaining situation with inside options is discussed in Chapter 6 in Muthoo (1999).
There it is shown that the inside options should be used to define the threat (or
disagreement) point in the Nash Bargaining Solution.
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3. Equilibrium Inefficient Institutions
We begin by deriving a proposition that characterizes conditions such
that in equilibrium at least one player refuses to bargain if and only if
the parameters satisfy these conditions. Thus, when these conditions
hold, the inefficient status quo remains in place; but not otherwise.
We then analyze these conditions in order to derive some more specific
results and insights about the persistence (or otherwise) of inefficient
institutions.
3.1. Characterization. Notice that for issue X, in isolation, player
preferences are monotonic in x: more x means more cake for player 1
and less cake for player 2. What about the equilibrium utility payoffs
P1(x) and P2(x)? Assuming, for expositional simplicity, that fi (i =
1, 2) is differentiable, it follows that monotonicity of P1(x) in x requires
that for any x ∈ [0,mX ],
1 + f ′1(x)−
1
2
[f ′1(x) + f
′
2(x)] > 0.
The interpretation of this inequality is that the utility gains from an
increase in x (the 1) cannot be dominated by a potential loss in equilib-
rium payoff on issue Y that is caused by the change in the inside option
payoffs. Similarly for player 2, monotonicity of P2(x) in x requires that
for any x ∈ [0,mX ],
−1 + f ′2(x)−
1
2
[f ′1(x) + f
′
2(x)] < 0.
Hence, both players’ equilibrium utility payoffs are monotonic if and
only if
(3) 1 >
1
2
[f ′2(x)− f ′1(x)] for any x ∈ [0,mX ].
Under the monotonicity assumption (i.e., when inequality 3 holds),
negotiations will not commence in equilibrium if and only if at least
one player’s per-period payoff from the status quo exceeds the maximal
possible payoff he could get from the bargain; that is, either P1(m
X) <
zX1 +z
Y
1 or P2(0) < z
X
2 +z
Y
2 . Using (1) and (2), and re-arranging terms,
we obtain
mX +
1
2
[mY + f1(m
X)− f2(mX)] < zX1 + zY1 ,(4)
mX +
1
2
[mY − f1(0) + f2(0)] < zX2 + zY2 .(5)
Define for each x ∈ [0,mX ], ∆(x) = [f2(x) − f1(x)]/2. The value of
∆(x) is a measure of the degree of inequality in the players’ ex post
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bargaining powers; in particular the advantage of player 2 over player 1
in the bargain on Y .8 Together with the definition of total disagreement
payoffs for player i, di = z
X
i + z
Y
i (i = 1, 2), we can then rewrite the
above as
mX +
1
2
mY − d1 < ∆(1),(6)
mX +
1
2
mY − d2 < −∆(0).(7)
Inequalities 6 and 7 have an easy interpretation. The right-hand side is
a player’s loss in bargaining power over the subsequent issue, evaluated
at that player’s maximally possible payoff. The left-hand sides are
the maximal payoff gains possible if there were no second stage status
quo payoffs. If, then, a player’s loss in second stage bargaining power
exceeds his maximal gain in a game without such bargaining power
differences, the player will refuse to negotiate. To summarize, we have
established the following (characterization) result:
Proposition 1. Assume that the functions f1 and f2 satisfy inequality
3. Then, in equilibrium, at least one of the players will refuse to bargain
(and the inefficient status quo remains in place) if and only if either
inequality 6 or inequality 7 is satisfied.
Thus, under the monotonicity assumption, if neither inequality 6 nor
inequality 7 holds then the players will strike an agreement over issue
X (and then over issue Y ). But if either one of these two inequalities
holds, then at least one player will refuse to bargain, and the inefficient
status quo remains in place.
Notice that we don’t really need monotonicity — all it does is to
ensure that player 1’s equilibrium utility payoff P1(x) is maximized at
x = mX and player 2’s equilibrium utility payoff P1(x) is maximized
at x = 0. So, in the absence of monotonicity, define x and x respec-
tively to be the supremum and infimum of {x ∈ [0,mX ] : P1(x)} and
{x ∈ [0,mX ] : P2(x)} — which exist since the functions P1 and P2 are
bounded. At least one player will refuse to bargain if and only if either
P1(x) < z
X
1 + z
Y
1 or P2(x) < z
X
2 + z
Y
2 ; that is, if and only if one of the
8Recall from above that the NBS on Y allocates
[
mY + f1(x)− f2(x)
]
/2 =
mY /2 −∆(x) to player 1, and [mY − f1(x) + f2(x)] /2 = mY /2 + ∆(x) to player
2.
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following inequalities holds:
x+
1
2
mY − d1 < ∆(x),(8) (
mX − x)+ 1
2
mY − d2 < −∆(x).(9)
Hence, we have the following more general characterization result:9
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, at least one of the players will refuse
to bargain (and the inefficient status quo remains in place) if and only
if either inequality 8 or inequality 9 is satisfied.
When will the conditions in these propositions be satisfied? We now
turn to an exploration of this question in order to determine which
environments lead to these results. There are, fundamentally, three
avenues which could contribute: the role of bargaining power itself,
both ex ante and ex post; the size of the efficiency gains (mX +mY −
d1− d2); as well as the change in bargaining power introduced through
the linkage of the second issue’s status quo payoff with the agreement
struck on the first issue.
3.2. Equal Bargaining Powers. Consider, first, the benchmark case
of perfect equality in both ex ante and ex post bargaining powers.
That is, the case in which (i) for k = X, Y , zk1 = z
k
2 , and (ii) for any
x ∈ [0,mX ], f1(x) = f2(x). The latter implies that ∆(x) = 0 for
all x ∈ [0,mX ]. For these parameter values inequality 3 holds and
thus Proposition 1 is applicable. Letting the identical inside option
over issue k be denoted by zk, and the identical new inside option on
issue Y be denoted by the function f , it is easy to verify that both
Inequalities 6 and 7 then collapse to
mX +
1
2
mY − zX − zY < 0
which cannot hold (since, by assumption, mk > 2zk for k = X, Y ).
Hence, we have established the following result:
Corollary 1. If the players have equal ex ante bargaining powers and
equal ex post bargaining powers, then, in equilibrium, agreement is
reached over both issues, and the inefficient status quo is replaced by
an efficient outcome.
9Indeed, the above derivation did not use continuity of fi either, and so also
covers the case where the bargaining power on the second issue may jump or flip at
certain critical values of the first — something which may happen if the first issue
involves voting rules or majority requirements, as in many constitutional bargains.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, in an environment in which players are
symmetrically placed — that is, have equal bargaining power in the in-
efficient status quo and would continue to have equal bargaining power
after reaching agreement over issue X but before reaching agreement
over issue Y — each of them has an incentive to get rid of the ineffi-
cient status quo and benefit from the efficiency-enhancing institutional
change. Notice that this conclusion holds even if the players’ ex post
inside options are adversely (or positively) affected by the agreement on
X, provided that they are affected in an identical manner — preserving
the relative bargaining powers of the players. Also note that the size
of the possible efficiency gains does not matter here. Furthermore, the
presence of the transaction costs are immaterial. Despite the limits
on contracting and the wealth constraint, the inefficient institution is
replaced.
An important implication of Corollary 1 is that inequality in the
players’ bargaining powers is necessary for the persistence of inefficient
institutions, an insight that we now explore in more depth.
3.3. Unequal Bargaining Powers. We begin the analysis of the gen-
eral case of unequal bargaining powers by first studying the special case
in which the players’ ex ante bargaining powers are unequal, but their
ex post bargaining powers are equal. That is, the case in which for any
x ∈ [0,mX ], f1(x) = f2(x) = f(x). This special case is the (approx-
imately) relevant case for many real-life situations (such as the land
redistribution situation) in which (i) there is a relatively large degree
of inequality in the players’ ex ante bargaining powers, and (ii) the
institutional change implied by an agreement over issue X eliminates
(or significantly reduces) the inequality in bargaining power over issue
Y . As such this special case may be of some interest in its own right,
besides being instructive. In fact, as we shall show, the main qualita-
tive results and insights obtained in this special case carry over to the
general case of unequal ex ante and unequal ex post bargaining powers.
3.3.1. Equal ex post, But Unequal ex ante Bargaining Powers. For any
x ∈ [0,mX ], let f1(x) = f2(x) = f(x), which implies that ∆(x) = 0.
Recall that we defined, for each i = 1, 2,
di = z
X
i + z
Y
i ,
which can be interpreted as a measure of player i’s “aggregate” ex
ante bargaining power. Inequality in the players’ aggregate ex ante
bargaining powers can be plausibly measured by, or interpreted as, the
“distance” between d1 and d2 — defined, for example, by the absolute
value of the difference between d1 and d2.
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Figure 1. Illustration of Corollary 2
In this special case under consideration, inequality 3 holds, and thus
Proposition 1 is applicable. Its easy to verify that inequality 6 and 7
respectively become:
mX +
1
2
mY − d1 < 0,(10)
mX +
1
2
mY − d2 < 0.(11)
Since the sum of the left-hand sides of these two inequalities exceeds
zero (by assumption,) both of them cannot hold. This implies that in
equilibrium at most one player would refuse to bargain. Denoting, for
notational convenience, d̂ = mX +mY /2, we have established that if,
for some i = 1, 2, di > d̂, then player i would refuse to bargain; and
moreover, dj < m
Y /2 (j 6= i) — since (by assumption) d1+d2 < mX +
mY . This analysis implies that for any pair d = (d1, d2) in the indicated
regions of Figure 1, there will be no negotiations in equilibrium (and
the inefficient status quo remains in place). In summary, we have
established the following result:
Corollary 2. Assume that the players have equal ex post bargaining
powers, but have unequal ex ante bargaining powers. Then, in equilib-
rium, negotiations don’t commence and the inefficient status quo re-
mains in place if and only if the degree of inequality in the players’
aggregate ex ante bargaining powers is sufficiently large.
The intuition behind this result comes from noting that when there
is a sufficiently large degree of inequality in the players’ aggregate ex
ante bargaining powers, an agreement on issue X would destroy the ex
POWER AND INEFFICIENT INSTITUTIONS 17
ante bargaining power advantage of one player (given the hypothesis of
Corollary 2 of equal ex post bargaining powers), and thus that player
has an incentive to refuse to bargain.
It should be noted that Corollary 2 shows that what matters for
the question at stake are the players’ “aggregate” ex ante bargaining
powers (as defined by d1 and d2). A player’s ex ante bargaining powers
over individual issues matter only to the extent that they determine his
aggregate ex ante bargaining power. For example, if player 1 has most
of the ex ante bargaining power over issue X (i.e., zX1 >> z
X
2 ), while
the opposite is the case over issue Y (i.e., zY1 << z
Y
2 ), then whether or
not the efficient outcome obtains depends on the relative magnitudes
of their aggregate ex ante bargaining powers. If d1 and d2 are close to
each other (which may happen in this example), then it follows from
Corollary 2 that the players would negotiate, and the inefficient status
quo would be replaced by an efficient outcome.
However, in some situations (such as in the land redistribution situ-
ation), a player who has most of the bargaining power over one issue
may well have most of the bargaining power on the other issue as well.
In that situation, the degree of inequality in the players’ aggregate ex
ante bargaining powers will be large, and may well be large enough to
induce the inefficient outcome.
A key message of Corollary 2 is as follows: a small degree of inequal-
ity in the players’ aggregate ex ante bargaining powers is conducive for
efficient institutional change, but not a large degree of such inequality;
in that case, inefficient institutions are likely to persist.
What role, if any, do the other parameters have? First, notice that
the players’ equal (by hypothesis) ex post bargaining powers have no
role to play on whether or not, in equilibrium, negotiations would com-
mence. This is formally implied by the fact that the function f does
not appear in inequalities 10 and 11. The intuition for this result comes
from the observation that the players’ incentives on whether or not to
negotiate are influenced by the relative magnitudes of their respective
ex post bargaining powers. If they are equal, then, irrespective of the
absolute magnitude of this common ex post bargaining power, it has
no role on incentives to bargain.
Finally, note the fairly intuitive but important result — which is
immediate from the above analysis — that, the larger are the efficiency
gains associated with institutional change the more likely it is that
such change will take place. In other words, even with a large ex
ante bargaining power advantage for one party, which does get lost in
negotiations, if there is enough of a payoff to redistribute, the party
will come to the table. This suggests, for example, that in order to
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promote efficiency-enhancing institutional change ways should be found
to enhance the associated gains from such change.
3.3.2. Unequal ex post and Unequal ex ante Bargaining Powers. Here
we impose no restrictions on the parameters. As such we apply the
characterization result stated in Proposition 2 and investigate 8 and 9,
restated here for convenience.
x+
1
2
mY − d1 < ∆(x),
(mX − x) + 1
2
mY − d2 < −∆(x).
It follows immediately from these inequalities that if ∆(x) is sufficiently
large then player 1 would refuse to bargain, and if ∆(x) is sufficiently
small then player 2 would refuse to bargain. This is not surprising. If
under the best possible scenario for player 1 (namely, when x = x) his
ex post bargaining power is significantly smaller than that of player 2
(i.e., ∆(x) sufficiently large), then he would have no incentive to bar-
gain. Symmetrically for player 2. An implication of these observations
is that if, for all x ∈ [0,mX ], the absolute value of ∆(x) is sufficiently
large, then at least one of the above inequalities would hold, and thus
at least one of the players would refuse to bargain. We state this result
in the following corollary:
Corollary 3. Fix the players’ (potentially unequal) ex ante bargaining
powers. If the degree of inequality in the players’ ex post bargain-
ing powers is sufficiently large, then, in equilibrium, negotiations don’t
commence and the inefficient status quo remains in place.
On the other hand, if the degree of inequality in the players’ ex post
bargaining powers is sufficiently small, then Corollary 2 applies. Again
note that the size of efficiency gains plays a role in this, and the larger
the gains the more likely is change. In the above this can be seen by
the fact that the left hand side of the inequalities is decreasing in the
ex ante disagreement payoffs of the players.
As a final check on the role of changing bargaining power versus
asymmetric bargaining power, consider the monotonic case with equal
ex ante power (hence d1 = d2 ≡ d) but unequal ex post power. In-
equalities 6 and 7 then become
mX +
1
2
mY − d < ∆(1),
mX +
1
2
mY − d < −∆(0).
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Since ∆(·) is bounded in absolute value by mY /2 while d is bounded
above by (mX +mY )/2 by assumption, the LHS of these inequalities is
greater thanmX/2. It follows that the status quo will likely be changed
in this situation if the initial issue is large relative to the second issue.
If, however, the initial issue is small compared to the second issue, and
the bargaining power in the second issue moves significantly against a
player, then that player will not want to negotiate.
A central message of our analysis can be put as follows (which ex-
tends the message derived from Corollary 2): a small degree of inequal-
ity in the players’ bargaining powers — both ex ante and ex post —
is conducive for efficient institutional change, but not a large degree
of such inequality; if the degree of inequality of either their ex ante or
their ex post bargaining powers is sufficiently large, then inefficient in-
stitutions are likely to persist. Furthermore, the larger are the gains in
efficiency compared to the differences in bargaining powers, the more
likely is institutional change.
4. Concluding Remarks
There is a close and deep connection between inequality in bargain-
ing power and the persistence of inefficient institutions.10 In particu-
lar, we unearthed a positive relationship between the degree of such
inequality and the likelihood of the persistence of inefficient institu-
tions. Our analysis drew out the distinction between ex ante and ex
post bargaining powers. This is important and fundamental. An in-
efficient institution may persist, for example, precisely because some
agents possess enormous bargaining power in the status quo which
they would loose after an efficiency-enhancing institutional change is
implemented. Such agents therefore have a vested interest in maintain-
ing the inefficient institutions that underlie the inefficient status quo.
As we discussed above, the persistence of the inefficient property rights
over landholdings in rural India is a case in point.
In fact, our model, results and insights are potentially applicable to
help explain the persistence (or elimination, as the case may be) of
inefficient institutions in the context of a great variety of economic,
political and social situations.
To take just one other example, consider the conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians. There is a status quo in place, which is inefficient
10Of course, as we discussed and as is captured in our model, this connection is
possible by the presence of various kinds of frictions (or transaction costs); for oth-
erwise Coase’s Theorem applies, and efficiency would be compatible with unequal
bargaining powers.
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(due in part to the costs and consequences of terrorism and military
engagements), and in which there is a great degree of inequality in
bargaining power; Israel possesses most of it. The conflict is over many
issues. However, some of these issues such as the right of return (of
Palestinian refugees to Israel), the future of Jerusalem, and property
rights over certain lands, are such that once agreements over them
are struck and implemented, they would be difficult to alter (since,
for example, the Palestinian people would physically move into such
lands). That is not the case, relatively speaking, with other issues such
as the elimination of terrorism. Notice, moreover, that agreements over
the former set of issues would significantly reduce Israel’s bargaining
power over the other set of issues. An application of our argument and
insights would suggest that the persistence of this costly conflict is due
(at least in part) to the large degree of inequality in ex ante bargaining
power.
The immediate, main “policy” consequences of our insights that
would help engender efficiency-enhancing institutional change are self-
evident: reduce inequality in bargaining power, limit change in bar-
gaining power, and/or enhance the efficiency gains associated with in-
stitutional change. Such conclusions should guide policy makers in the
right direction. But the matter of exactly how one does such things
depends on the particular situation in question.
Institutions — be they economic, political or social — lie at the very
heart of modern societies. Some are explicit, while others are only
implicit. Some are formalized in laws and regulations, while others
are part of the culture and norms. They shape human behaviour,
and determine economic performance and individual well-being. As
such the importance of exploring ways to promote and induce efficient
institutional change is crucial, especially for the benefit of the poorer
parts of the world. Our analysis has only just touched the surface of
the burning issues and questions. We hope others will take-off from
where we have left.
Appendix: A Numerical Example from Industrial
Organization
Recall the R&D joint venture problem outlined in the introduction.
Two firms are involved in a two stage game, in which they first in-
vest in R&D effort and then compete in a product market (see, for
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example, Tirole (1989)). In the status quo, the firms conduct R&D in-
dependently and non-cooperatively, which is inefficient since there are
dis-economies to R&D.
The second (product market competition) stage is modelled as fol-
lows. The two firms have constant marginal cost and are Bertrand
(price) competitors in a homogeneous goods market. This assumption
serves to allocate bargaining power to the low cost firm. Profit shar-
ing agreements are illegal, but the firms may share the market. In
order to convexify the payoff frontier it is assumed that the firms may
share the market probabilistically, that is, each may be the monopolist
with some probability.11 The surplus from collusion is shared according
to the Nash Bargaining Solution with the Betrand Nash Equilibrium
payoffs as threat points.12
Suppose that market demand is linear, and that inverse demand is
given by P = 1−Q. The firms’ marginal costs are c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1). The
monopoly prices for the firms are thus pmi = (1+ ci)/2, with monopoly
profits of pimi = (1 − ci)2/4. There are two cases to consider: equal
marginal costs, and unequal marginal costs. In the first case the Nash
equilibrium of the Bertrand price competition game will have each firm
sell at the common marginal cost, and thus both firms have zero profits.
The NBS for the collusion game then allocates the monopoly profits
equally, and each firm will obtain a profit of (1− ci)2/8.
In the second case, the low cost firm will serve all the market. Call
the low cost firm Firm 1. Firm 2’s cost are either above Firm 1’s
monopoly price, in which case Firm 1 simply is a monopolist, or below,
in which case Firm 1 sells 1− c2 units at a price of c2. Since there is no
surplus from product market collusion if firm 1 sells at its monopoly
price we will focus on the second case. The Nash equilibrium for the
Bertrand game therefore has payoffs for Firm 1 of (c2 − c1)(1 − c2).
Firm 2 obtains zero in either case. The payoff frontier from collusion
(allowing for randomization) is
pi2(pi1) =
(1− c2)2
4
− (1− c2)
2
(1− c1)2pi1.
11In many markets it is legal for a firm to withdraw from the market
“voluntarily”.
12The NBS is used for convenience only, similar results can be obtained using an
alternating offers type bargaining game. We make the usual assumption that the
Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game for two firms with constant marginal costs
involves the firms sharing the market at a price equal to their marginal costs, if
marginal costs are equal. If marginal costs are unequal, the low cost firm will serve
all of the market at the lower of its monopoly price or the high cost firm’s marginal
cost.
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In the Nash Bargaining Solution each player receives half of the surplus
in excess of his disagreement payoff (inside option). It follows that the
NBS for the collusion game has payoffs of:
(pi1, pi2) =
(
(1− c1)2
8
+
(c2 − c1)(1− c2)
2
,
(1− c2)2
8
− (c2 − c1)(1− c2)
3
2(1− c1)2
)
In the first stage of the game the firms may invest in R&D which
can lead to an innovation that reduces the marginal cost of production
below the current lowest marginal cost. The probability of achieving
such a breakthrough is independent of the initial marginal cost of the
firm. Research comes in discrete lumps, each at a fixed cost of k.
One may think of these as research laboratories. The success of any
given laboratory is independent of the success of any other laboratory.
Furthermore, the technology exhibits dis-economies, so that the prob-
ability of a successful innovation by any given laboratory is declining
in the total number of laboratories in operation.13
In this first stage of the game the firms can either operate inde-
pendently or cooperate on R&D. Cooperation on R&D is efficiency
enhancing since it saves on the duplication of effort (investment cost)
as well as internalizing the externality. We will focus on an equilibrium
in which both firms operate one lab. Let p2 denote the probability of
success for a lab if two labs are in operation, and let c denote the new
marginal cost from the drastic innovation, where c < c1 < c2. In order
for the Bertrand equilibrium not to occur at the monopoly price we
require that 2c2 > 1− c, i.e., c > 1− 2c2. By computing the payoffs for
both firms if they do invest, and comparing them to the payoff if they
do not, we can find restrictions on the investment cost k for which it
is an equilibrium for both firms to invest in one lab in the absence of
collusion. For example, if c = 0.25, c1 = 0.3, c2 = 0.4, k = 0.002, and
p2 = 0.2 we get expected firm profits of 0.0850234 for the low cost firm
and 0.0321484 for the high cost firm. Total expected industry profits
in this equilibrium are therefore 0.117172.
Now suppose the firms were to cooperate on investment. Under
the above parameters the equilibrium for the collusive R&D game will
involve investment in one laboratory if p1 = 0.3.
14
The expected payoffs before investment costs are then 0.0849688 for
the low cost firm and 0.0371652 for the high cost firm, for industry prof-
its of 0.120134, net of the investment cost of k = 0.002. Cooperation
thus is indeed joint profit maximizing.
13We are thinking here of an unmodelled limited supply of suitable scientists.
14Of course, p3 must be suitably chosen to make it optimal for there not to be
three labs.
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However, no matter how the R&D expenditures are allocated, the
firm with the initial low costs (Firm 1) will not find it in its interest to
engage in joint R&D since its maximal expected profit of 0.0849688, ob-
tained by not bearing any of the R&D costs, is less than the 0.0850234
it can achieve by refusing to cooperate.15
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